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Abstract 
Distributed manufacturing operations include cyber-physical systems vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Long time not considered a 
priority, cybersecurity jumped to the forefront of manufacturing concerns due to the need to network together legacy, newer 
equipment, and entire operation centers. This paper proposes trustworthiness solutions for integrated manufacturing physical-
cyber worlds, where trustworthiness is defined to complement system dependability requirements with cybersecurity 
requirements, such that the resulting manufacturing cyber-physical system delivers services that can justifiably be trusted. 
Acknowledging the inevitability of cyber-attacks, the paper models the cybersecurity component using the resilient systems 
framework, where system resilience is viewed as preservation of a required state of cybersecurity. 
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1. Introduction 
The current manufacturing worldwide operations trend imposes the presence of all established requirements in 
terms of manufacturing design processes and actual operations, combined with an increased safety and flexibility of 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-386-226-7535; fax: +1-386-226-6678. 
E-mail address: babicear@erau.edu 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of the 27th International Conference on Flexible Automation and 
Intelligent Manufacturing
974   Radu F. Babiceanu and Remzi Seker /  Procedia Manufacturing  11 ( 2017 )  973 – 981 
operations. In addition, it requires the presence of more recent cybersecurity protection of electronic transactions 
between distributed operation centers [1].  
The high-tech progress in material science research, and the information and communication technologies made 
the development of manufacturing cyber-physical systems a reality. Not only physical facilities can be linked 
together through network applications and coordinate their applications, but also physical operations can be 
simulated in real-time in cyber centers. The resulting benefits are significant, and to name a few, cyber-physical 
coordination leads to reduced raw material used in testing, prototyping, and actual operations, as well as increased 
safety of finished products [2]. Moreover, the manufacturing cyber-physical systems include a wide range of sensing 
devices and data processing capabilities that can provide online monitoring of manufacturing processes, thus further 
reducing the chances of scrapped lots and increasing the safety of the actual manufacturing operations, through 
production abort commands, whenever hazardous events, or out-of-specifications environment conditions are 
detected [3]. 
Since all good things come with a price tag, the path towards manufacturing cyber-physical systems has one of its 
own. Just as all other network-based or Internet-based systems, cyber-physical distribution of manufacturing 
operations include systems vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Long time not considered a priority, cybersecurity jumped to 
the forefront of manufacturing concerns due to the need to network together legacy, newer equipment, and entire 
operation centers. Many of the legacy operations are controlled by Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) systems that automatically monitor and adjust process control activities and control physical pieces of 
equipment [4, 5]. However, many SCADA systems were designed and built in the 1980s without any regard of 
cybersecurity. Recent research discusses also the need to network traditional stand-alone equipment such as PLC-
controlled and CNC machines, which were never designed with any control measure for data security. The newer 
systems have their cybersecurity problems of their own, as many of the Internet of Things devices embedded on 
physical manufacturing equipment, such as sensors and data processing and communication hardware, are reported 
to be easily hacked and become the port of entry for intruders to the manufacturing network data centers [6, 7]. 
Given all the above issues, within the manufacturing and cybersecurity fields, the capability of virtualized 
manufacturing operations to prevent, respond, thwart and/or recover from cyber-attacks is now becoming an active 
area of research.  
This paper proposes trustworthiness solutions for integrated manufacturing physical-cyber worlds, where 
trustworthiness is defined to complement system dependability requirements with cybersecurity requirements, such 
that the resulting manufacturing cyber-physical system delivers services that can justifiably be trusted. System 
dependability, traditionally, includes operational availability, reliability, safety, and maintainability requirements, 
which can only be enhanced by the advancement of cyber-physical systems in manufacturing operations. 
Cybersecurity includes aspects such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, and assurance of data 
transactions and/or computer systems, and to a lesser extent anonymity of data records and transactions. 
Acknowledging the inevitability of cyber-attacks, this paper models the cybersecurity component using the resilient 
systems framework, where system resilience is viewed as preservation of a required state of cybersecurity [8, 9].  
From this point forward, the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the trustworthy manufacturing 
cyber-physical model, with its dependability and cybersecurity requirements, and introduces the concept of system 
resilience in the face of cyber-attacks. Next, Section 3 provides insights for the cyber-resilience mechanisms through 
simulation modeling. The paper concludes with a brief section summarizing the importance of cybersecurity 
adoption within manufacturing domain and a discussion related to needed further investigation of manufacturing 
cyber-physical systems. 
2. Trustworthy Manufacturing Cyber-Physical Systems 
Previous authors’ work identified the framework for the development of manufacturing cyber-physical systems, 
emphasizing aspects such as complex event processing, virtualization, Internet of Things adoption, Big Data 
analytics, and cyber-attacks targets and vehicles [1-3]. This current work goes further into modeling aspects by 
adding to the mix traditional operational requirements such as availability, reliability, safety, and maintainability, 
many times known as system dependability, and detailing cybersecurity protection mechanisms. 
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Fig. 1. Trustworthiness requirements within the manufacturing cyber-physical systems framework. 
The resultant system, presented in Fig. 1, is deemed as exhibiting trustworthiness requirements by delivering 
services that can be trusted with a certain level of confidence. The dependability and cybersecurity requirements that 
form the trustworthiness platform use a combination of lower level requirements usually present in physical 
processing and computer network systems. System operational availability, reliability, maintainability, and safety 
requirements are well studied in the manufacturing literature and are not the subject of this work. On the cyber 
world side, the cybersecurity requirements are part of the computer and network security domains, but have not been 
studied in detail from the manufacturing environment perspective. Both the dependability and cybersecurity 
requirements in the context of manufacturing domain are detailed in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Elements of trustworthiness for the manufacturing cyber-physical system. 
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The actual requirements listed in Fig. 1 and 2 are likely examples of what dependability and cybersecurity 
requirements would be for actual distributed manufacturing operations. Availability, reliability, and maintainability 
of manufacturing equipment is defined by its vendors, so it could vary based on the scope and resources. Safety 
requirement is using the IEC 61508 [10] standard for programmable controllers in the process control industry, but, 
once again, it could vary based on the scope and resource. Confidentiality, integrity, and data availability are known 
in the security community as the CIA triad [11]. Confidentiality assures protection of data from disclosure to 
unauthorized parties and is usually enforced through data encryption. Integrity assures data protection from being 
modified by unauthorized parties and is usually ensured through archiving and redundancy of data transmission. 
Availability assures that authorized parties are able to access the data when needed, and it is obtained through 
different mechanisms that protect the system and data from external attacks, such as denial of service attacks. The 
other two cybersecurity requirements, authenticity and assurance are complementary to the CIA triad and further 
help distributed manufacturing actors in trustworthy data transactions through digital signature capabilities and 
permission and protection mechanisms. 
3. System Resilience Research Methodology 
There is a growing literature in the domain of system resilience, and a significant number of definitions were 
proposed. The common denominator of all resiliency definitions includes the following aspects: unexpected event, 
nominal performance, degradation of performance, recovery, and specific amount of time acceptable for each 
application. Thus, we define system resilience as the ability of the system to recover to its nominal performance 
level, in an acceptable amount of time, after the occurrence of an unexpected event that resulted in a degradation of 
the level of performance, well below the nominal level. There are at least two comprehensive literature overview in 
the resilience arena, with the second one published just a few months ago [12, 13]. While resilience can reside in 
both the physical and cyber worlds, and thus is a key aspect for low cost, continuous, manufacturing operations, this 
work builds models for the system resilience in the face of cyber-attacks, or cyber-resilience. 
Looking again at the above resilience definition, one of its blurred aspects is related to the amount of time 
considered acceptable for each application. This carry a paramount importance for cyber-resilience given the 
extremely strict time requirements imposed on cyber systems. The recovery length of time could be short, in which 
case the system exhibits high resilience, or it could be longer, in which case the system is said to have low resilience.  
For two systems that are perturbed by the same external unexpected event at the same time, and degraded to the 
same level of lower performance, the low and high resilience systems bounce back to the initial level of performance 
in significant different timeframes. As an interesting fact, the same type of behavior was also observed in non-
engineering systems [14]. The low and high cyber-resilience profiles are presented in Fig. 3 below. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Low and high resilience profiles. 
The amount of time to recover to the initial level of performance, if possible, is one of the most used resilience 
metrics identified in several works [15-17]. Another straightforward metric is given by the impact on performance 
calculated either, as the difference between nominal level of performance and the degraded level of performance, the 
proportion of the degraded level of performance in relation to initial nominal performance level, or the area under 
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the performance curve which is lost. Those metrics can be easily inferred on the chart of Fig. 3. There are other 
resilience metrics proposed in the literature, out of which this work will look at the network-related ones [18]. Even 
resilience is viewed as an after the fact approach measured through one of its metrics, the trustworthy manufacturing 
cyber-physical system considers embedding resilience mechanisms into both the physical and cyber worlds to 
eliminate or mitigate the effects of any system malfunction and/or breach. Specifically, this work considers cyber-
resilience aspect and models resilience mechanisms with the objective of preservation of the required state of 
security. 
This research objective is exemplified in the diagram of Fig. 4, where the distributed manufacturing system is 
subjected to directed external events, such as cyber-attacks, and random disturbances, which are both processed 
within the data module through cyber and physical resilience mechanisms. The resilience metrics need be chosen 
such that they model the changes in the system performance as inferred from Fig. 3. Also, the resilience mechanisms 
need be designed such that they minimize the adverse impact of the external events and recover the system to the 
required state of security in an acceptable amount of time. The type of mitigation and recovery algorithms depend on 
the scope and layout of the system under analysis, as distribution of manufacturing nodes within a network may 
differ from one layout to another.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Distributed manufacturing system network. 
4. Manufacturing Cyber-Resilience Mechanisms Simulation Model 
Distributed manufacturing across different location geographically distinct requires a constant exchange of 
design, testing, control, and operations data. This adds to the communication needs between the physical world --
physical manufacturing-- and cyber world --simulated manufacturing-- already discussed above. The simulation 
model considers the operations of a manufacturing system network formed of two distributed manufacturing 
organizations (systems), each of them including a certain number of manufacturing nodes, subjected to denial of 
service (DOS) attacks. The DOS attacks target either the two distributed systems or the network between the two 
distributed systems. The two distributed systems form a manufacturing network on their own with physical and 
cyber worlds components, while the larger network connecting the two distributed systems includes only cyber 
world components. The overall distributed system is presented in Fig. 5, where the block stereotype model either a 
physical or cyber component, while the flow specification stereotype model elements of the internal or external 
communication networks. 
4.1. Cyber-resilience metrics and mechanism 
The resilience metric included in the model is the performance of the communication link to forward packets 
(data and/or control packets) between two network nodes, and across the entire network when the network nodes are 
subjected to DOS attacks. The model considers that a node of a network is targeted with a defined probability, and 
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the attack is successful with another defined probability. The actual packet flow performance comes from the 
network science domain and is defined as the percentage of maximum flow that a directed network supports as edges 
are blocked or removed from the network [15, 19]. Thus, the flow performance of a network link can be defined as: 
 
Fig. 5. Distributed manufacturing system network. 
? ? ? ? ?????  (1) 
where, ? ?  is the flow forwarded by a node into a link at time ?, and ???? is the nominal flow forwarded by a 
node into a link. 
 
It results that the link flow resilience can be defined as: 
? ? ? ? ? ???? ? ?????  (2) 
where, ? ?  is the probability that the node is attacked at time ?, and ???? is the probability that the attack on the 
node is successful. 
 
The resilience mechanism included in the model is designed to re-route the packets subject to delays through 
other less crowded communication links should any of the node processing becomes slow or unable to forward data 
and/or control packets. A similar mechanism could be devised using the actual packet queues measured in front of 
the processing nodes with rerouting occurring based on algorithmic evaluation of queue lengths. A measure for the 
performance of the resilience mechanism, R, is defined in relation with the percentage of denied service. The denied 
service includes the number of packets that were discarded at the under-attack nodes. Packets can be discarded due 
to time delays in queue or exceeding queue capacity. 
? ? ????  (3) 
979 Radu F. Babiceanu and Remzi Seker /  Procedia Manufacturing  11 ( 2017 )  973 – 981 
where, ?? is the number of packets discarded, and ?? is the total number of packets forwarded through the 
network. 
4.2. Design of simulation experiments and simulation results 
Using the distributed model depicted in Fig. 5, the nodes of the simulation model at time zero are linked as 
follows. Within the two distributed systems, each of the six nodes (block modules) have active links, with nominal 
performance, with each of the three flow specification modules. Outside the distributed systems, each of the six edge 
block modules also have active links, with nominal performance, with six out of the nine network flow specification 
modules. The simulation variables and decision modules include the created packets created (communication load), 
packet processing at nodes (packet forwarding), decision variables related to node forwarding and link flow (DOS 
attacks), and decision modules to re-route (resilience mechanisms). The communication load created in the system is 
the same for both sets of simulation replications and the node forwarding process comes from the same statistical 
distributions. Also, for both sets of simulation replications, the DOS attacks are using the same distributions and are 
initialized at the same clock time. In other words, equal intensity and duration DOS attacks are activated in the 
models.  
In the first set of 100 simulation replications, DOS attacks target the internal distributed systems network and 
resilience mechanisms are activated once the attacks are detected. The results of this simulation, identified as 
component-level resilience profile, are presented in Fig. 6. The second set of 100 simulation replications consider 
DOS attacks targeted at the communication network outside the two distributed systems and the resilience profile, 
depicted as system-level resilience, are shown in Fig. 7. However, for both sets of replications the attacks still target 
all the nodes of the part of model under study that carry flow at the time when DOS attacks are activated.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Component-level resilience profile for the two distributed systems. 
 
Fig. 7. System-level resilience profile for the network connecting the two distributed systems. 
It can be seen from the two figures that the degradation in performance is more significant for the component-
level resilience profile, which does not fully recover to its initial nominal performance level in the set simulation 
replication time. The calculated percentage of denied service for the two sets of simulation replications is depicted in 
Fig. 8. All the simulation variables listed above are coming from statistical distributions and can be customized for 
different system scenarios. 
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Fig. 8. Maximum percentage of packet denied service for the two sets of simulation. 
5. Conclusions and Future Directions 
This paper proposes a framework for the development of trustworthiness solutions for manufacturing cyber-
physical systems, which include dependability and cybersecurity requirements. Detailed modeling is only performed 
for the cybersecurity aspects by modeling a series of denial of service attacks against an overall manufacturing 
network formed by physical and cyber world nodes. The results of the simulation study show that the cyber-
resilience mechanisms are better deployed when the number of network nodes is larger to permit re-routing of 
packets in the network. By generalizing the results, it may be possible to adapt the solution to the cyber-resilience of 
system-of-systems models, in which case it may become apparent that the resilience of the system-of-systems level 
is higher than that of individual component systems of the system-of-systems. 
Future research directions include the analysis of other cybersecurity attacks and their influence on the 
component-level and system-level cyber-resilience. On another direction, the work can be enhanced by adding other 
trustworthiness components to the system resilience model and evaluate their influence on the derived resilience 
metrics.  
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